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WHY A STATE EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS FROM SCHOOL CHOICE
PROGRAMS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
THOMAS C. BERG*
For this symposium on state "Blaine Amendments," I will
focus on perhaps the most prominent current question concerning
these state constitutional provisions: their effect on programs
providing tuition vouchers or scholarships to parents of K-12
children for use at a school of the parents' choice. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,' held that a properly
designed school choice program including religiously affiliated
schools is consistent with the First Amendment's Establishment
2Clause. But a number of state constitutional provisions will likely
be read to be more restrictive and to forbid the inclusion of
religious schools in a choice program. For example, a number of
state provisions bar any state aid to support or benefit any sectarian
school,3 or "any school.., controlled by any church, sectarian or
religious denomination., 4 These provisions will be used in political
debate to block the passage of school choice programs, or to
*Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota).
Thanks to Melissa Rogers for inviting me to participate in the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life's symposium, Separation of Church and States An
Examination of State Constitutional Limits on Government Funding for
Religious Institutions, one of her many excellent efforts in organizing civil
discussions of religious freedom issues among persons of differing
perspectives.
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Id. at 653.
3. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("No money or property of the state shall be
given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or
institution.").
4. IDAHo CoNsT. art. IX, § 5. For catalogs of state provisions and their
varying language, see Toby Heytens, Note, School Choice and State
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117 (2000); and Frank R. Kemerer, State
Constitutional and School Vouchers, 120 ED. L. REP. 1 (1997).
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exclude religious schools from any program that passes, and they
will serve as the basis for legal challenges to enacted programs that
include religious schools.
This article sets forth the case that such an exclusion of
religious schools is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in
particular the Free Exercise Clause. To deny an educational
benefit to an otherwise eligible child because the family chooses to
use the benefit for a religiously informed education is to impose an
unconstitutional condition on rights of religious activity and
expression.
In addition to setting forth this case, I wish to make some
other points. First, I want to emphasize that the case for including
religious schools equally in voucher programs does not ultimately
rest on a principle of treating religion the same as other ideas and
activities. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses treat
religion as a distinctive category of activity and allow for special
measures to limit government action with respect to religion.
Rather, the equal inclusion of religious schools in a choice program
rests more fundamentally on the value of individual choice: that
government should, as much as possible, minimize the incentives it
creates for families to choose religious schools, or not choose them,
6as opposed to the alternatives.
Finally, the article briefly rebuts some of the common
arguments for excluding religious-school choices from educational
aid programs. I argue that most of the concerns that arise from
including religious schools-social divisiveness, intrusions on
religious autonomy-are also present, perhaps even more seriously,
when religious schools are excluded.
5. See infra Part I.A. I make this argument at much greater length in
Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (2003).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.
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I. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST EXCLUDING
RELIGIOUS-SCHOOL CHOICES
A. The Precedents: No Discrimination Against Religious Activity
and Expression
In terms of precedent, the primary argument against
excluding religious schools from a school choice program is that the
exclusion constitutes discrimination against religious activity and
expression, and such discrimination is strongly presumed invalid.
Under the Free Exercise Clause, the bedrock rule is that the
religious activity of private individuals and groups may not be
singled out for a disability. While religious exercise may seldom be
constitutionally entitled to special accommodation, under the rule
of Employment Division v. Smith,8 religious exercise is strongly
protected against being singled out for unfavorable legal treatment.
The leading decision is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,9 which struck down laws that prohibited the killing
of animals solely for reasons of ritual sacrifice.0
The presumption that discrimination against religion is
invalid extends beyond cases of discriminatory coercive regulation,
to cases involving the discriminatory denial of benefits. The most
relevant decision is McDaniel v. Paty," which held that Tennessee
violated free exercise rights by singling out clergy as an occupation
for exclusion from service in the state legislature. 2 Justice Brennan,
in an influential concurring opinion, emphasized that the state
could not assume that clergy would be more dangerous and
destructive forces in the legislature than would other persons: the
First Amendment, he said, does not permit "treat[ing] religion, and
those who teach or practice it... as subversive of American ideals
8. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that government restrictions which
only incidentally affect religious practice are constitutional).
9. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
10. Id. at 545-47.
11. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
12. Id. at 629.
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and therefore subject to unique disabilities."' 3  For the same
reasons, a state cannot single out religious schools, as a class, for
exclusion from participation in a school choice program.14
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Davey v. Locke," in which
certiorari has now been granted, further supports the constitutional
challenges to the exclusion of religious-school choices, and the case
may well be the occasion for the Supreme Court to make clear that
16such exclusions are invalid. Davey struck down a Washington
state program that offered scholarships to college students but
excluded those pursuing a religion major from a religious
perspective. By withdrawing the scholarship from an otherwise
eligible student solely because he chose a program incorporating a
religious orientation and religious instruction, the court held the
state unconstitutionally conditioned a benefit on the recipient's
willingness to forego his free exercise rights. The rationale for the
state support-" 'the benefit to the state [from] assuring the
development of [students'] talents' ,17_ is present with the religious
13. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. The Religion Clauses' requirements of nondiscrimination and
neutrality toward religion distinguishes the case of religious-school funding
from the decisions in which the Court has allowed government to fund
childbirth but not abortion. The Court has made clear that the right in Roe v.
Wade, 403 U.S. 113 (1973), "protects the woman from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy,"
but "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment
by the allocation of public funds." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977);
see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-74 (1992) (holding
that the Constitution prohibits "undue burdens" on the abortion decision but
"does not forbid a State... from expressing a preference for normal
childbirth"). By contrast, the state must be neutral on religious questions; it
may not express preferences about religion of the sort it expresses about
abortion and childbirth. The state has no power "to make a value judgment
favoring [nonreligion] over [religion], and to implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds." Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74. The goal of religious
freedom is for the government to stay out of religious choices, not for it to
influence those choices up to a point just short of imposing an "undue
burden."
15. 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 2075 (2003).
16. Id. at 760.
17. Id. at 756.
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major as well, for certainly a religious major can help a student get
a job and become a productive, taxpaying member of society. The
state's denial thus "communicate[d] disfavor"'8 toward, and
discouraged the choice of, an education with "a defined level of
intensity of involvement in protected religious activity;" 19 just as the
state in McDaniel unconstitutionally placed a disability on those
who took their faith seriously enough "to impel [them] to join the
ministry."20
The same arguments apply to the denial of K-12
scholarships, vouchers, or other tuition aid to families who choose
religious schools. The selective denial discourages religious-school
choices and, at least prima facie, communicates disfavor of them.
The denial of the benefit also goes beyond simply refusing to fund
religious teaching, which the state arguably may do in the exercise
of its discretion over its funds." On this score, the exclusion is even
less defensible than the exclusion of college theology majors in
Locke v. Davey. Even more plainly than a theology major, a
satisfactory K-12 education in math, English, and history in a
religious school imparts secular knowledge and provides significant
secular value to society-yet a state exclusion of religious schools
withholds benefits even for that unquestionable educational
contribution. The family is not merely denied assistance for
religious teaching, but is penalized for choosing to pursue its child's
basic K-12 education in a religious setting.22
18. Id.
19. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 632 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
20. Id. at 631.
21. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (permitting
government to prohibit the use of funds allocated to family-planning programs
for abortion counseling and referrals, as long as those programs could engage
in such speech in a separately funded program).
22. For elaboration of this argument, distinguishing voucher exclusions
from permissible benefits denials as in Rust v. Sullivan, see Berg, supra note 5;
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 989, 1017-18, 1046-47 (1991). See also
Davey, 299 F.3d at 755 (distinguishing total denial of benefit to individual
from Rust-type condition requiring individual to fund disfavored activity out
of private sources).
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The other major challenge to the exclusion of religious
schools arises under the Free Speech Clause. A long series of
decisions hold that to exclude religious groups or individuals from
generally available benefits is an unconstitutional discrimination
against speech because of its religious viewpoint. The decisions
extend at least as far back as Widmar v. Vincent,23 more than twenty
years ago, and culminate most recently in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School.2' The decisions also include Rosenberger v.
25
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, which applied the
principle to viewpoint discrimination in affirmative government
funding-holding that the university could not subsidize the
operations of a wide range of student publications and then refuse
such assistance to a magazine because of its religious editorial• 26
perspective.
Several propositions from these decisions support the
argument that excluding religious schools from a choice program is
presumptively unconstitutional. First, when the state provides
benefits to a reasonably wide range of private groups, the exclusion
of a group simply because of its religious affiliation is invalid. Most
school choice programs do indeed provide benefits to a fairly wide
group of schools, defined primarily by criteria of educational
quality and not by some particular set of views that the state wishes
to promote. The state may exclude a few views at the outer
perimeter, as the Cleveland program in Zelman did,27 but for the
most part, choice programs tend to accept a wide diversity of views.
Indeed, the fundamental premise of Zelman is that the ideological
views of schools participating in a voucher program are not adopted
23. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that in creating a generally open forum,
a state university could not exclude religious speech from that forum without a
compelling justification).
24. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that it is a violation of the Free Speech
Clause to discriminate against a religious viewpoint even in a limited public
forum).
25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
26. Id. at 831.
27. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6)(Anderson 2002)
(forbidding participating schools to teach unlawful behavior or "hatred of any
person or group" based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion).
[Vol. 2
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or endorsed by the state.n If the state was endorsing the viewpoint
of participating schools, then religious schools would have been
barred from participation under settled Establishment Clause
principles prohibiting the government from endorsing religion.
Second, religion as a category is not a separate subject
matter that can be excluded by fiat from the scope of a program
involving education. Rather, religion is as much a viewpoint or
perspective on how to educate. Therefore, to exclude religious
schools as a category bears no relation to the educational goals of
the program in question. These points are especially clear in Good
News Club, which held that Christian worship, singing, and Bible
memorization could not be excluded from a forum allowing access
to schoolrooms for any group "that 'promote[s] the moral and
character development of children.' ,29 Just as the state could not
simply define religious teaching as outside the bounds of "moral
and character development," it cannot set up a program of aid in
which private schools participate primarily based on their
educational performance, and then simply define religious schools
as ineligible even though they meet the performance standards. In
Good News Club, that a student group held a religious perspective
on morals and character was irrelevant to whether it fit within the
category of moral and character development.0 Similarly, the fact
that a school's perspective on education is religious is irrelevant to
whether it fits within the category of institutions providing
educational options for parents.
These principles remain relevant even though a school
choice program involves monetary subsidies, and even though it
may not involve a full-fledged public forum designed solely to
facilitate expression. The prohibition on viewpoint discrimination
against private speakers has force even when the government is
providing subsidies, as the Court held in Legal Services Corp. v.
28. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 ("The incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government,
whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.").
29. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108.
30. Id. at 111.
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Velazquez31 -and remember, the expression by religious schools in
a voucher program is unquestionably private rather than
32governmental. Furthermore, viewpoint discrimination is invalid
even in a so-called nonpublic forum, if the speech in question
otherwise fits within the parameters of the forum, such as subjectS . 33
matter or speaker identity. If a school choice program is open to a
significant range of educational choices but disqualifies religious-
school choices, this is unquestionably viewpoint discrimination and
is presumptively invalid.
B. The Ultimate Issue: Religious Choice, Not Formal Equality
The constitutional case against excluding religious schools
from voucher programs appeals to Supreme Court precedents, like
Lukumi and Rosenberger, which emphasize nondiscriminatory
treatment of religion. However, the nondiscrimination theme may
31. 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001) (holding that forum and viewpoint
discrimination principles still "provide some instruction" in subsidy cases, and
that withdrawal of legal-services funding for arguments challenging federal
welfare legislation was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
32. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. United States v.
American Library Association, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003), which upheld the
conditioning of federal funds on a library installing Internet filters to block
pornography from children, does not undercut the claim that excluding
religious schools from a voucher program is unconstitutional. Although public
libraries do not endorse every publication in their collections, they do make
content-based choices about what material to collect, "material of requisite
and appropriate quality for educational and informational purposes." Id. at
2308 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, public libraries in that case were to
some extent choosing their own messages. In addition, and importantly,
government need not be neutral toward pornography as it must be toward
religion. "[L]ibraries have traditionally excluded pornographic material from
their collections," id., and unquestionably public schools can teach children
that pornography should be avoided. But schools plainly cannot teach
students that religion should be avoided. Again, religion is a neutrality right,
and government should not influence private choice on religious matters in the
way it can attempt to influence other private choices.
33. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 391-94, (1993) (invalidating the exclusion of religious viewpoints);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., et al. 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
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give a misleading impression. It might suggest that the reason to
include religious schools in a choice program is simply to treat
religion the same as other activities or perspectives concerning
education. Many opponents of school choice argue, correctly, that
it would be a great mistake to do away generally with distinctive
constitutional rules for religious activity and organizations. They
point out, correctly, that the First Amendment, in both the
Establishment and the Free Exercise clauses, treats religion
differently from other human activities.
In particular, critics have argued that treating religious
schools equally in programs of vouchers and other government aid
is inconsistent with-and will undermine-any distinctive
protection for religious exercise in the face of coercive laws and
regulations. Treating religion the same as other activities under the
Establishment Clause, the critics say, entails treating it the same as
other activities under the Free Exercise Clause. The result, they
say, has been decisions such as Employment Division v. Smith,3
which held that (for the most part) the government may
constitutionally impose severe burdens on religious practice as long
as the law applies equally to nonreligious activity." Equal
treatment, in short, means the loss of any distinctive constitutional
protection for religious exercise.3 Indeed, it might mean that
distinctive protection for religion is forbidden.
A number of scholars, including myself, believe that the
equal participation of religious choices in benefits programs is
consistent with maintaining a distinctive concern for religious
freedom in the face of legal burdens.37 Our position has been
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. See id. at 880 (finding the application of a "neutral, generally
applicable" law, in most cases, poses no constitutional challenge).
36. Thus, for example, Derek Davis, a strong opponent of vouchers and
other educational aid, says that "the Smith decision was the logical
consequence of the Court's application of its 'formal neutrality' concurrent
with its loosening of limitations on government establishment." Derek H.
Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modem Cultural Assault on the Separation of
Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1035, 1058 (2002).
37. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 693, 744 (1997); Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and
Misconceptions No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13
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criticized as inconsistent. Professors Lupu and Tuttle have
described our camp as "driv[ing] on [a] one-way street[]," treating
religious institutions as "distinctive when that characterization
relieves them of regulatory obligations, but not when it seals them
off from government benefits."38 Likewise, Professor Brownstein
has objected to "the proposition that religious practices and
institutions should be treated as the exact equivalents of their
secular counterparts when government spending decisions are
reviewed, while religion receives a uniquely favored status when it
is burdened by regulatory legislation."'3 9
But these arguments are misplaced for several reasons. To
begin with, the equal participation of religious entities in benefits
programs does not rest ultimately on the maxim of equal treatment,
that religious entities must be treated formally the same as others.
Rather, equal treatment with respect to benefits ultimately serves a
deeper constitutional value: preserving the choice of private
individuals and groups in religious matters.
Take K-12 school vouchers as an example. If religious
schools are ineligible for cash vouchers, then parents have a greater
financial incentive to choose state-supported, secular schools,
public or private (which the parents are forced to pay taxes to
support). This is particularly true for low-income families who
cannot easily pay the tuition charged by a school unsubsidized by
the state. Excluding religious schools from voucher programs
greatly distorts families' choices. Including religious schools on the
same terms as others prima facie eliminates that distortion. This is
"substantive" neutrality, in Douglas Laycock's words: the
government seeks to minimize the incentives that its actions give to
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285, 313-17 (1999); Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 349-
51(1996).
38. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 49 (2002) (adding
that one needs to look elsewhere "[f]or consistent answers to our question").
39. Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality
Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
243, 277 (1999).
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private persons either to practice or not practice religion.40
The Supreme Court approved vouchers under the
Establishment Clause based on a theory of parental choice or
substantive neutrality, not a theory of formal equality or mere
sameness of treatment. Zelman held that the Cleveland
scholarships were "programs of true private choice," under which
tax-generated money reaches religious schools "only as a result of
the genuine and independent choices of private individuals." 41 Of
the three factors that led to this conclusion, only one of them was
the program's formal equality of terms-that it was "neutral in all
respects toward religion"42-and that factor mattered only because
there were "no 'financial incentive[s]' that 'skew[ed]' the program
toward religious schools."43
The other two factors directly point to the value of
individual choice. One was that the aid went not "directly to
religious schools," but directly to parents and families "who, in
turn, direct the aid to religious schools.., of their own choosing."4
The Court signaled that it would continue to place special limits on
government directly appropriating money for religious schools45 a
distinction defensible in terms of individual choice because with
many direct appropriations the allocation is made by government
officials rather than by the various families' choices of what school
to attend.46
40. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001-06 (1990).
41. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
42. Id. at 653.
43. Id. (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)).
44. Id. at 649.
45. Id.
46. It can be argued persuasively that direct aid programs that allocate
money on a per capita basis-that is, as a function of the number of students
that enroll in a school-are consistent with the choice value because the
choices of numerous families still dictate the amount of aid. See Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810-11, 829-30 (2000) (plurality opinion). But Justice
O'Connor, who holds the controlling vote on this issue, still requires
additional limits on all direct aid programs because with such programs a
family who chooses a particular school has no choice over whether state
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Finally and most importantly, Zelman required that there
be "genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular
educational options" as alternatives to religious schools.4 7 The
premise appears to be that if there were no real secular options,
then parents' choice of religious schools was not "genuine and
independent."'4 This factor therefore represents an important step
toward grounding the jurisprudence of aid to religious institutions
firmly in the notion of individual choice concerning religious
matters. In a discussion that, significantly, took up the longest part
of the opinion, the majority held that Cleveland did offer genuine
secular options. These included secular private schools and a
variety of public options including charter ("community") schools,
magnet schools, and supplemental tutoring in the regular public
schools.49
So Zelman emphasizes religious choice; excluding religious
schools from voucher programs distorts families' choices; and
including religious schools on equal terms is the course most
consistent with choice. In Professor Laycock's terms, the equal
inclusion of religious schools is the most substantively neutral
course: it minimizes the incentives that the government creates
either for or against religious practice.
By contrast, where religious exercise conflicts with
regulatory laws, private religious choice is maximized, at least
sometimes, by distinctive treatment for religion-that is, by
granting exemptions to religious practice. When a generally
applicable law prohibits conduct that a religious person must
engage in as part of his faith, it creates a powerful incentive to
abandon the practice or the faith. After Smith, for example, Native
American Church members in a state that criminalizes peyote must
give up the central act of their worship services if they want to
avoid jail or fines. Exemption has the prima facie effect of
money may follow the child to that school. See id. at 841-44 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (cited and followed in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649).
Whichever of these views is correct, both are animated by the principle of
private choice.
47. 536 U.S. at 655.
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id. at 656-60.
[Vol. 2
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promoting religious choice by removing government regulations
that, in absolute terms, restrict religion.
But the choice-based analysis has not only an absolute
component, but also a comparative one. That is the lesson from the
analysis above concerning vouchers: allowing parents to use
benefits at secular schools but not religious schools creates a
disincentive, in comparative terms, to the religious-school choice.
Similarly, if the exemption of religiously motivated conduct creates
an incentive to choose that conduct over the secular alternatives,
then exemption would be improper under a choice analysis. That
incentive will exist in cases where the exemption coincides
substantially with self-interest- as may well be the case, for
example, with most claims to tax exemptions. As Professor
Laycock puts it: "If religious objectors to paying taxes do not have
to pay, there is an incentive to adopt the faith that gives rise to the
objection.
'" 50
But this does not undercut most religious exemptions. To
quote Professor Laycock again, in most cases:
[E]xemptions minimize the incentive effects.
Most religious behavior is meaningless or
burdensome to nonbelievers. I do not want to
have a driver's license without a picture; I
would have a harder time cashing checks or
proving my identity in other contexts. I do not
want to refrain from work on the Sabbath; I am
too far behind as it is. I do not want to eat
peyote; I would almost certainly throw up.
Most exemptions do very little to draw
adherents to a faith.51
Those who believe that exemptions from regulation,
combined with equal access to benefits, loads the dice in favor of
religion should remember that these are not the only major
50. Laycock, supra note 37, at 350. For other arguments distinguishing
self-interest from other exemptions, see Berg, supra note 37, at 705, and
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 700-01 (1992).
51. Laycock, supra note 37, at 350.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
category of cases under the Religion Clause. The third major area
of Religion Clause case law involves expression by government in
public institutions such as public schools, government buildings, and
so forth. In that context, religion is singled out for "disfavored"
treatment under the Establishment Clause. Government may not
speak religiously, teach that religion or any particular faith is true,
or sponsor religious expression; but it may do all those things with
respect to secular ideas and perspectives. That is the lesson of the
decisions forbidding official school prayers, Bible readings, moral
instruction in the Ten Commandments, and promotion of
creationism." To repeat an argument I have made previously:
A public school teacher may teach the truth of
democracy or free markets, but not of
Christianity, Islam, or other religions; he or she
may participate enthusiastically in the chess or
scuba diving club, but not the Bible study club.
The school may schedule its commencement
ceremony to begin with the Pledge of
Allegiance or a Walt Whitman poem, but not
with the Lord's Prayer.53
These constitutional restrictions on government sponsored
religion are extremely controversial. Many people believe that the
52. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, (1992) (prayers);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, (1987) (creationism); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, (1980) (Ten Commandments); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Ten Commandments); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
(1962) (prayers).
53. Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation,
and Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 415, 440 (1999). The point is
merely strengthened by the recent court of appeals decision striking down the
religious reference "under God" in the Pledge requiring that the exercise
contain only secular language. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003) (mem). The Establishment Clause ban even
extends to government sponsorship of all religions on an equal basis. The
public school cannot conduct "nonsectarian" or "nondenominational"
religious ceremonies, see Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589-90; Engel, 370 U.S. at 430,
and presumably it cannot sponsor the prayers of varying denominations on
different days in rotation.
2003] EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 37
restrictions create the impression that religion is, if not false, then at
least unimportant to the moral, civic, and intellectual training of
children. Undeniably, the government speech decisions single out
religious ideas for limitation. But the rule against government
inculcation of religion, especially within public schools, is correct-
even though it treats religion differently from other ideas and
perspectives-because it leaves religious matters to the choice of
individuals and minimizes government's influence over those
choices.
If we are keeping crude scorecards, then, the score really is:
religion treated more favorably than secular ideas once (free
exercise), treated less favorably once (government speech), and
treated basically equally once (benefits for education and other
temporal social purposes). All three rules are best explained by the
principle of minimizing government's effect on private persons'
choices whether to practice religion or not.
The Supreme Court expressed the balance struck under the
Religion Clauses in a passage in Lee v. Weisman, the decision that
invalidated a public school's inclusion of a short,
nondenominational prayer by a rabbi at a graduation ceremony.
The Court acknowledged that sustaining objections to the prayer
meant treating religion very differently from other ideas,
"[S]tudents may consider it an odd measure of justice to be
subjected during the course of their educations to ideas deemed
offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formal prayer
ceremony that the school offers in return."54 But, the Court said,
this distinctive treatment followed from the Establishment Clause
principle that "[in] religious debate or expression," unlike with
secular ideas, "the government is not a prime participant."55
Rather, "[tihe design of the Constitution is that preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and
a choice committed to the private sphere, which is itself promised
freedom to pursue that mission."56  Therefore, while the
Establishment Clause restricts government's religious expression,
54. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 591.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 589.
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the Free Exercise Clause calls for accommodations to preserve
"freedom to pursue [the religious] mission."57  With respect to
government benefits, equal treatment of religious options is the
course most consistent with religious freedom, to prevent the
distortion of the religious choice that follows from the favoring of
secular options.
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS ARE INADEQUATE
In the light of this prima facie case, the exclusion of
religious-school choices from a voucher program requires a strong,
if not a "compelling," justification. The justifications commonly put
forward for such exclusion are inadequate. Most of these asserted
justifications share a common fault: the dangers that they see in
including religious schools in a choice program are present just as
much or more so when religious schools are singled out for
exclusion.
A. Divisiveness
Consider, for example, the argument that including religious
schools in choice programs will foment "divisiveness" by including
religious schools "that preach religious hatred, racial bigotry, the
oppression of women, and other views."58 Set aside the fact that
some secular private schools may engage in the same objectionable
practices or expression, and that most religious schools do not, and
57. Id.
58. Laura S. Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom,
78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463, 477 (2001); see also Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 684 (2002) (warning of "the impact of religious strife"
and citing "the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and
the Middle East to mistrust one another"); id. at 715, (Souter, J., dissenting)
("As appropriations for religious subsidy rise, competition for the money will
tap sectarian religion's capacity for discord."); id. at 717 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing at length "the risk that voucher programs pose in
terms of religiously based social conflict"); Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers
and Beyond The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 188-89 (2000).
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that therefore the appropriate remedy is to exclude the offending
schools, not religious schools as a category.-" In addition, excluding
religious schools from choice programs may well produce more
social strife than including them would.
Currently, considerable political and social strife stems from
denying families important educational benefits because of the
ideology of the schooling they choose. As Professor Rick Duncan
notes, "The public schools have become one of the primary
battlegrounds in the culture war. ' 60 If religious families are pushed
into public schools by the state's refusal to support the religious
alternative, it is only natural that they will fight for the inclusion of
religious content in the public schools-measures such as prayers at
school events, or creationism in the classrooms, that far more
directly impose religion on others than school choice programs do.
But if choice programs are enacted including religious schools,
many such parents will likely take their children elsewhere and
leave the public schools in peace. 62 As a reviewer of a recent book
on diversity summarizes: "The greater our tendency to
monopolize, the more fierce become our battles over
multiculturalism; and the more we learn to rely on private solutions
such as vouchers, the more likely that the passions will be
diffused."63
59. Some such schools might be excluded from a choice program based
on constitutionally valid conditions on participation-such as a condition that
participating schools not discriminate on the basis of race in employment or
admissions. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983).
60. Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious
Inequality, 1996 BYU L. REv. 569, 580.
61. For chronicles of such disputes, see STEPHEN BATES,
BATTLEGROUND ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993).
62. Of course, the extent to which choice programs actually facilitate the
movement of religious parents out of public schools depends on how broad
the programs are-in particular, whether they extend beyond the limited
urban-district pilot programs enacted to date.
63. Alan Wolfe, The One and the Many, TlE NEW REPUBLIC, June 9,
2003, at 26, 29 (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA
KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE (2003)).
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In this light, it is both inaccurate and constitutionally
impermissible to treat religious schools as uniquely divisive and on
that basis exclude them from choice programs. Recall Justice
Brennan's statement in McDaniel v. Paty that government may not
"treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue
of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and
therefore subject to unique disabilities." 64 For similar reasons, the
Supreme Court has discarded its one-time doctrine that aid to
religious schools could be invalidated because it caused "political
divisiveness. 65 When controversy and division are possible either
way, the proper course is to treat religious educational choices the
same as other educational choices.
B. Religious Autonomy
Or consider the argument that school choice programs, like
other forms of government assistance, will bring with them
conditions and regulations that will intrude on the autonomy of
religious organizations and thereby weaken religion as an
66independent cultural force. The argument appeals back to, among
64. 435 U.S. 618,641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971)
(announcing the doctrine, referring to "the divisive political potential" of
school aid programs); with Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988)
(rejecting the doctrine, for all but cases of "direct financial subsidies" to
religious schools); and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n.11 (1983)
(same). The reasons the Court gives for rejecting the doctrine include the fact
that on many political issues, opinions divide along religious lines, Kendrick,
487 U.S. at 617 n.14, and the concern that the mere divisiveness caused by the
filing of a lawsuit might be used to invalidate the practice that the suit
challenges. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). In essence, the
Court adopted the same reasoning as in the text that by definition, any course
pursued on a controversial subject will cause political division.
66. Various expressions of this argument include, for example, Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (Powell, J. concurring in judgment) (asserting
state inspections accompanying provision of aid "surely rais[e] more than an
imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of a creed' " (quoting
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 650)), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-14 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). See generally Melissa Rogers, Traditions of Church-State
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other things, James Madison's warnings that tax assessments for
teachers of religion would undermine "purity and efficacy of
religion." 67 While this is a strong argument against heavy regulation
of voucher participating schools-extensive regulation will
undercut the very goals of diversity and competition that the
programs claim to seek-it is weak as a ground for excluding
religious schools. An otherwise eligible school can challenge
burdensome conditions and regulations by objecting to them.
Indeed, standing to raise such intrusions on autonomy should rest
with the school, not with a taxpayer plaintiff who sues to forbid the
aid or with the state that excludes religious schools from receiving
it. In Professor Laycock's words, "An atheist plaintiff asserting a
church's right to be left alone even at the cost of losing government
aid is the best possible illustration of why there are rules on
standing."'
Moreover, the exclusion of religious schools might cause the
same danger the voucher opponents fear. Excluding religious
schools poses a threat to their vigor and autonomy. In the words of
Vincent Blasi, "Dependency on public resources is a dangerous
condition for religion, to be sure, but so is the condition of
competing in the educational marketplace with the well-financed
institutions-and some would say the religiously subversive
orthodoxies-of the modern welfare state. 69 State subsidies for
secular schools attract families, especially those of modest means,
who might otherwise choose religious schools. Religious schools
Separation Some Ways They Have Protected Religion and Advanced Religious
Freedom and How They Are Threatened Today, 18 J.L. & POL. 277 (2003);
Davis, supra note 36.
67. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), 7, reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, ET AL.,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63, 65 (2002).
68. Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy as Part of the Free
Exercise of Religion, in 2 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS
AFFAIRS 28, 38 (1986); see also Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Case
for the Constitutionality of School Choice, 10 GEO. MASON U. Clv. RTs. L.J. 1,
38-41 (2000).
69. Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty Seven
Questions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
783, 798 (2002).
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often have trouble surviving in the face of such an uneven playing
field; ever since the 1850s, the push for equal state assistance for
religious schools has been fueled by that reality.70
Thus, religious schools and families determining whether to
participate in choice programs face a very different question than
Madison did when he opposed tax assessments for religious
teaching: today the state already affects religious schools, and in
some cases jeopardizes their survival, by funding their secular
competitors. At best there are hazards to a religious school's
autonomy and mission from either participating or not participating
in a choice program. Thus the school (and by extension the families
using it) should be left to judge whether participation will help or
harm the mission.
C. Compelled Aid to Religious Teaching
Finally, there is the argument that including religious
schools in a school choice plan will compel taxpayers to provide
assistance to religious teaching to which they may be opposed.7'
But this argument is insufficient as well. It conflicts with Zelman's
conclusion that under a true private choice program, the
government aids the individual family: it is the family, not the
government, that sends money to a religious school, much like "the
government issuing a paycheck to an employee who, in turn,
donates a portion of that check to a religious institution."72 Only a
70. See LLOYD JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL,
1825-1925, at 100 (1987) (quoting Illinois public school superintendent's
report in 1857 that creation of free public schools, together with ban on aid to
private schools, had in only two years "nearly swept the entire field of the
thousands of Private Schools which then existed"); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-
Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121,
157-58 (2001) (describing how Catholic school closings helped motivate
campaigns for equal participation in state aid in the early 1970s).
71. The argument echoes Thomas Jefferson's dictum that "to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions in
which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical." Thomas Jefferson,
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in MCCONNELL,
supra note 67, at 69, 70.
72. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
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very broad, attenuated concept of aid extends to the decision by
numerous families to use their educational benefits at a religious
school among a number of other choices.
Indeed, if the state excludes religious schools from a
voucher program, it then favors the schools that provide education
from a secular perspective: public schools and secular private
schools. Education from a secular perspective competes with
education from a religious perspective. And yet under a religious-
school exclusion, religious citizens who are opposed to the
separation of religion from education are forced to pay taxes for
secular schools while being denied assistance for their own
conscientious educational choice. This is an imposition on their
conscience as great as any imposition on the taxpayer opposed to
religious schools-greater, perhaps, because the imposition comes
through explicit discrimination against religious-school choices.
CONCLUSION
A state rule excluding religious schools from a school choice
program for which they would otherwise qualify is prima facie
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Although several of
the precedents for this conclusion speak in terms of
nondiscrimination and formal neutrality, ultimately the soundest
rationale against excluding religious schools lies in preserving
individual choice. The exclusion of religious schools distorts
families' choices on how to educate their children and pressures
them to choose secular education, while the equal inclusion of
religious schools promotes choice. Under this approach, treating
judgment) (following Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)).
73. I agree with Professor Underkuffler that "religion or freedom of
conscience is a uniquely powerful force in human life and law" that "religion
ha[s] unique power," and therefore that "compelled taxpayer funding" in this
context is a matter of special constitutional concern. Underkuffler, supra note
58, at 477. But where she is concerned only with "funding of religious
activities and religious institutions", id., in my view the concern extends to
compelling religious citizens to support an educational funding system that on
its face discriminates against religious education.
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religion equally in terms of educational benefits is consistent with
treating it distinctively in other areas of Religion Clause disputes.
The exclusion of religious schools therefore requires a strong
justification, and none of the common justifications are sufficient.
In particular, the exclusion of religious schools causes the very
problems that it claims to avoid: social divisiveness, imposition on
taxpayers' conscience in religious matters, and threats to the vigor
of religious schools.
